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ABSTRACT: Individuals playing a sequence of different games have shown to learn about the other player’s behavior 
during their initial interaction and apply this knowledge when playing another game with the same individual in the 
future. Here we use a published computational cognitive model to generate predictions for an upcoming human study. 
The model plays both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken Game with a confederate agent who uses one of two 
predetermined strategies and whose level of trustworthiness is manipulated. We go beyond the standard postdictive 
practice and adopt the increasingly popular practice of using the model to make a priori predictions before the human 
data will be collected in an upcoming study. 
 
1.     Introduction and Background 
 
How people learn to trust one another over time and how 
they use this information to inform their future decisions is 
a question relevant to many aspects of human interaction. 
Trust is defined as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the 
expectations that they will perform a particular action” 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Trust relationships 
have been proposed to be self-sustaining once developed, 
allowing individuals to forgo re-evaluation of a person 
after they have been determined to be trustworthy (Hardin, 
2002). Yamagishi, Kanazawa, Mashima, and Terai (2005) 
found that when participants played a modified version of 
the game Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), where participants 
could choose the amount of points they could risk during 
each round, over time participants would gradually 
increase the number of points they would risk as the 
individuals began to establish trust for one another. 
Consistent with these results, Castelfranchi & Falcone 
(2010) suggest that trust mitigates risk and develops 
through gradual risk-taking between two individuals.   
 
In order to study how individuals behave in different 
situations, both economic and psychological research have 
used games of strategic interaction. A game represents an 
abstraction of a real-world scenario in which participants 
can win and lose points based on the behavior of both 
players. Participants can play either with another human 
participant (e.g., Juvina, Saleem, Martin, Gonzalez, & 
Lebiere, 2013) or with a preprogrammed strategy (e.g., 
Juvina, Lebiere, Martin, & Gonzalez, 2012). 
 
Two different strategies that have been used in place of 
human participants during these games of strategic 
interaction are the Tit-for-Tat (T4T) (Axelrod, 1984) and 
the Pavlov-Tit-for-Tat strategy (PT4T) introduced by 
Juvina, Lebiere, Gonzalez and Saleem (2012). T4T is a 
simple strategy, which repeats on round N the same choice 
that the other player made on round N-1. The PT4T 
strategy is a combination of two different strategies, T4T 
and Pavlov. Pavlov is another simple strategy that 
continues to choose the same choice on round N as long as 
it earned points with that choice on round N-1, only 
changing choices on round N when it lost points on round 
N-1. The PT4T strategy repeats the other player’s move 
from N-1 on round N, just as the T4T strategy, except for 
when the strategy and the other player make opposite 
choices and the strategy earns points on that round. Instead 
of switching to the other player’s choice as the 
T4T strategy would, the PT4T strategy repeats its previous 
choice, as the Pavlov strategy would. The PT4T strategy 
was created based on analysis of the repetition propensities 
(the probability to repeat a move following a certain 
outcome) of humans in PD and in an attempt to develop a 
strategy that had similar repetition propensities as humans 
(Juvina et al., 2012). 
 
Previous research has found that when individuals play 
games of strategic interaction sequentially, they use the 
information gained about the other player from a previous 
game to inform their choices when playing with that person 
again (Juvina et al., 2013). Different explanations have 
been offered for why these transfer effects occur, such as a 
similarity between the games, the expectation of the other 
player to behave as they did in the past, or a strategy that 
was used during a simpler game continuing to be used in a 
more complex game (Knez & Cramer, 2000; Devetag, 
2003; Bednar, 2012 ). 
 
Juvina et al. (2013) found that these explanations failed to 
account for the transfer effects seen when repeated rounds 
of the games Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Chicken Game 
(CG) were played sequentially. As an alternative 
explanation for why transfer effects occur between these 
games, Juvina et al. (2013) proposed that it is the increase 
in reciprocal trust between the two players that results in a 
transfer of learning occurring between these games, 
allowing them to find the optimal outcome faster in the 
second game compared to the first. Juvina, Lebiere, and 
Gonzalez (2014) implemented this idea of reciprocal trust 
in a computational cognitive model that replicates the 
transfer effects seen when the games PD and CG are played 
sequentially in either order. 
 
The results in Juvina et al. (2014) were obtained by fitting 
the model post-hoc to the human data from Juvina et al. 
(2013) by manipulating certain model parameters. 
However, fitting the model post-hoc to a specific dataset 
does not ensure its validity and generalizability. In order to 
fit the human data, the model played against itself, using 
both the same parameters and learning mechanisms to 
determine how to play both games. This is problematic 
when trying to understand real world scenarios where 
individuals are likely to have different goals and 
understandings of the current situation. Due to these 
differences, it has not yet been shown that the model can 
account for human behavior when playing against an 
individual who has a different approach and a different 
level of trustworthiness. 
 
We are attempting to validate the model used in Juvina et 
al. (2014) by using the model to simulate the results of an 
upcoming study to be conducted with human participants. 
The model will play two games sequentially, either PD and 
CG in varying orders or one of the two games twice with a 
preprogrammed confederate agent. The confederate agent 
will use one of two predetermined strategies and will have 
varying levels of trustworthiness. A comparison of the 
model’s predictions to the behavior of human participants 
will allow for an opportunity to examine in what types of 
situations the model can predict the behavior of human 
participants. In this article, a brief overview of the model 
and the experimental design of the simulation is offered, 
along with a discussion of the model’s predictions for the 
upcoming study to be conducted with human participants.  
 
1.1 The Games 
 
Participants will play repeated rounds of the same two 
games used in Juvina et al.’s (2013) original study, which 
are PD and CG. Both PD and CG are mixed motive non-
zero sum games and are represented by their own payoff 
matrix (Fig 1.1). During each round in a game, both Player 
1(P1) and Player 2 (P2) choose to either defect (A) or 
cooperate (B). Based on the choices made by both players 
during every round, P1 or P2 either win or lose a certain 
number of points.  
 
 
  
Fig 1.1. The payoff matrix for the game Prisoners dilemma 
(left) and Chicken Game (right). 
 
When either PD or CG is played continually and both 
players do not know how long they will play, each game 
has a different optimal outcome. In PD, the optimal 
outcome over the course of the game is for both players to 
choose B (mutual cooperation) in order to earn one point 
each during each round (Fig 1.1). In CG, the optimal 
outcome is for both players to asymmetrically alternate 
between choosing A and B, earning three points every 
other round (Fig 1.1). However, when playing either CG or 
PD, attempting to choose the optimal outcome is risky. If 
only one player understands the benefits of sustaining the 
mutual cooperation or alternation outcome and is willing to 
reciprocate, then the player who attempts the optimal 
strategy will lose points as the other player gains points. To 
avoid this, players must learn to mutually cooperate with 
one another by sustaining the optimal outcome throughout 
the game, which maximizes their payoffs when either PD 
or CG is played repeatedly (Juvina et al., 2013). Due to the 
fact that each game has a different optimal outcome, the 
behavior of both players should change along with the 
games that are played. 
 
Although PD and CG have different payoff matrices, 
certain characteristics are similar across both games. There 
are both surface and deep similarities. The surface 
similarity between PD and CG that is relevant in this 
context is that both players during either game can choose 
B to earn one point during each round. Both games also 
share a deep similarity that is both players mutually 
cooperating with each another brings about the optimal 
outcome when either game is played repeatedly. Players 
can mutually cooperate by both choosing B in PD and 
asymmetrically alternating between A and B in CG (Juvina 
et al., 2013). Juvina et al. (2013) has found that when PD 
and CG are played sequentially the transfer effects between 
these games occur along both the surface and deep 
similarities. In particular, more mutual cooperation was 
seen in PD when played after CG and more alternation was 
seen in CG when played after PD. 
 
1.2 The Model 
 
A brief overview of the model used to generate the 
predictions of the upcoming study is given here; a more 
detailed description of the model can be found in Juvina et 
al. (2014). The model was built in ACT-R (Adaptive 
Control of Thought - Rational), which is both a cognitive 
architecture and a theory of human cognition (Anderson, 
2007). In ACT-R, different modules interact with each 
other in order to complete a task. In the model used for this 
study, two memory modules are used in order to play both 
games; these are the declarative and procedural modules. 
The declarative module stores information that the model 
has learned from the environment. The procedural memory 
allows for action selection reinforced through reward 
patterns that occur within the environment (Anderson, 
2007). Both modules are used together to account for 
human behavior in the two games when played 
independently and sequentially.  
 
In order for the model to be able to play either game, it 
needs to be aware of the interdependence between itself 
and the other player; to do this the model uses instance-
based learning (IBL: Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003). 
In IBL, past instances of an event are stored in a model’s 
declarative memory to be recalled later, and inform future 
decisions. When the model is in a situation similar to a 
previous experience, it uses information stored in its 
declarative memory to make a decision about what to do in 
its current situation. At each round, the model stores in its 
declarative memory the previous move of both itself and 
the other player along with the other player’s move for the 
current round. Throughout both games, each time the 
model stores a copy of a previous instance that has already 
been placed in its declarative memory it increases the 
probability that that specific instance will be recalled when 
placed in a similar situation again, as controlled by ACT-
R’s activation equations (Anderson, 2007). 
To account for the behavior of the human participants in 
each game, the model uses both IBL and reinforcement 
learning. During each round, the model attempts to recall a 
previous instance from memory using both its own and the 
other player’s previous move as retrieval cues. The stored 
previous instances in the model’s declarative memory 
allow it to recall what the other player’s next move was 
when placed in that situation before. The model predicts 
that the other player will choose the move that was chosen 
more frequently when placed in similar situations in the 
past. The model then chooses to cooperate or defect 
depending on which choice has the greatest utility given 
the model’s prediction of the other player’s move. Previous 
rewards the model has received for cooperating and 
defecting in similar contexts (i.e., the other players 
expected next move based on the previous move of the 
other player and the model) determine the utility or the 
value of these choices to the model (Juvina et al., 2014). 
 
In order to account for the deep transfer effects seen when 
PD and CG are played sequentially, two trust accumulators 
and three different reward functions were added to the 
model. The two accumulators are called trust and trust-
invest. Each accumulator starts at zero at the beginning of 
the first game and increases or decreases depending on the 
moves both the model and the other player make after each 
round. The trust accumulator increases when both players 
either mutually cooperate or when the model defects and 
the other player cooperates. It decreases when both players 
mutually defect or when the model cooperates and when 
the other player defects. The trust-invest accumulator 
increases with mutual defections and decreases with 
unreciprocated cooperation. Throughout either game the 
current levels of the trust and trust-invest accumulators 
determine the model’s current reward function. 
 
Three reward functions are used which reinforce the 
model’s choices differently for each of the four possible 
outcomes that can occur during a game, in turn affecting 
the model’s behavior. By alternating between three 
different reward functions, the model uses the reward 
function that is most applicable to its current situation. The 
reward function that is applied to the current round of the 
game is determined by the level of the trust and trust-invest 
accumulator. When the trust accumulator is positive, the 
model is reinforced for increasing the payoff of both 
players. When only the trust-invest accumulator is positive, 
the model is reinforced for increasing the payoff of the 
other player. When both accumulators are at or below zero, 
the model is reinforced for maximizing its own payoff and 
minimizing the payoff of the other player. 
 
2. The Experiment 
 
The model predictions presented in this paper were 
generated by simulating a fully balanced 4 x 2 x 2 
experiment that will be conducted with human participants. 
Participants will play both PD and CG or one of these two 
games twice. Instead of participants playing games with 
one another as in Juvina et al.’s (2013), participants will 
play with a “confederate agent”, implemented as a software 
agent. The confederate agent will use one of two 
predetermined strategies and the trustworthiness of the 
agent will be controlled, while playing both games. The 
model was run in conditions identical to those that future 
participants will be placed in.  
 
On Qualtrics.com, the online platform that will be used to 
run the upcoming experiment, we created sixteen 
conditions with each possible combination of game order, 
confederate agent’s strategy, and trustworthiness. In each 
condition, ten preprogrammed versions of each game were 
developed to ensure random variability in the behavior of 
the confederate agent. Once the experiment begins 
participants will first be randomly assigned to a condition 
and then randomly assigned to play one of the ten possible 
versions of each of the two games they will play during the 
experiment. The experimental protocol for the upcoming 
study was copied when generating model predictions, 
simulating fifty human participants in each condition. 
 
2.1 The Confederate Agent 
 
The confederate agent will utilize one of two 
predetermined strategies throughout both games. The T4T 
strategy will choose on round N the choice that the other 
player made on round N-1. The PT4T strategy will 
reciprocate mutual cooperation and defection, but will not 
reciprocate unilateral cooperation.  
 
Along with using one of two predetermined strategies, the 
confederate agent’s trustworthiness will be manipulated 
and randomness will be added into its behavior. To 
accomplish this, the confederate agent will either cooperate 
or defect a certain number of times throughout each game 
at random times. In the high trustworthiness (HT) 
condition the confederate agent will cooperate and in the 
low trustworthiness (LT) conditions the confederate agent 
will defect. For this experiment, we wanted to create a 
confederate agent that would generate significant 
differences in the outcomes that were chosen across all 
conditions. To accomplish this, multiple model predictions 
for all conditions were run by varying the number of rounds 
the confederate agent employed its strategy (reactive 
strategy – T4T or PT4T) and automatic cooperation or 
defection (fixed strategy). We found that, because PT4T is 
inherently less trustworthy than T4T (i.e., more apt to 
defect), to avoid the model only predicting a high 
frequency of mutual defection during the PT4T HT 
conditions, a larger percentage of cooperation was needed 
to raise the strategies trustworthiness. For this experiment, 
during the T4T conditions, the confederate agent will 
employ the T4T strategy randomly during 90% of the 
game, while randomly employing its fixed strategy during 
10% of the game. During the PT4T conditions, the 
confederate agent will employ the PT4T strategy randomly 
during 65% of the game and randomly employ its fixed 
strategy during 35% of the game. 
 
3. Results and Discussion of the Model’s 
Predictions 
 
We computed the frequency of five relevant outcomes 
during each round in every condition over the fifty 
different model runs. In order to determine instances of 
asymmetrical alternation, rounds where one player chose 
to defect while the other player cooperated or vice versa on 
round N and had both chosen the opposite choices on round 
N-1 were identified. The frequency of alternation during 
each round across all conditions was computed like all 
other outcomes. Because of the limitation of space in this 
paper, we cannot report all of the results. All of the model’s 
predictions are available for viewing and can be 
downloaded at  
(http://psych-scholar.wright.edu/ijuvina/publications). A 
linear mixed effects analysis (LME) was used to assess the 
effect of strategy, trustworthiness of the confederate agent, 
and order in which the games were played on the predicted 
frequency of the five outcomes. P-values were obtained 
using a likelihood ratio test comparing a full to a reduced 
model. The 95% confidence intervals for the effects 
predicted by the LME are also reported. It should be noted 
that the confidence intervals that are reported are large, 
which is expected given the large variability generated by 
each ACT-R model, the randomness added to the 
confederate agent, and the multitude of experimental 
conditions. The model’s predictions will be compared to 
human data from each condition, once the experiment has 
been run.   
 
Transfer effects were assessed using a paired t-test, run on 
the frequency of each outcome during the first game 
compared to the frequency of that outcome when the same 
game was played second against a confederate agent of the 
same strategy and level of trustworthiness. Significant 
results indicate that the order in which the model played 
the game affected the frequency that an outcome was 
chosen during that game. 
 
3.1 Effects of Trustworthiness 
 
One clear difference seen across the high and low 
trustworthiness conditions in the model’s predictions is the 
level of the trust accumulator. A t-test run on the round-by-
round average of the magnitude of the trust accumulator 
across the simulated low (M = -66.86, SD = 38.11) and high 
(M = 62.36, SD = 39.17) trustworthiness conditions was 
found to be significant (t(49) = 66.87, p <  .001). The 
model’s current level of the trust accumulator affects which 
current reward function is used and will determine whether 
the model will attempt to maximize its own payoff or the 
payoff of both players. The difference in the trust 
accumulator between the simulation of the high and low 
trustworthiness conditions indicates that the experimental 
manipulations of trustworthiness were effective. Based on 
its level of trust, the model predicts a difference in the 
frequency that mutual defection will occur in both games, 
despite differences in the strategy used by the confederate 
agent and order. 
 
A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of 
mutual defection as a dependent variable, trustworthiness 
of the confederate agent as a fixed effect, with strategy, 
order, and round as random factors. A likelihood ratio test 
was run and found that the trustworthiness of the 
confederate agent was found to have a significant effect on 
the predicted frequency of mutual defection (X2(1) = 277.3, 
p < .001), increasing the frequency of mutual defection by 
75.07% ± .6%, 95% CI [52% , 98 %], during the simulated 
low trustworthiness conditions compared to 15.4% ±6.5%, 
95% CI [0 , 37.33%], in the simulated high trustworthiness 
conditions (Fig. 1.2). 
 
 
Fig 1.2. The average round-by-round frequency that 
mutual defection was chosen across all of the simulated 
high (dashed red line) and low (solid black line) 
trustworthiness conditions. 
 
The trustworthiness of the confederate agent determines 
whether it will cooperate (high trustworthiness) or defect 
(low trustworthiness) for a specific number of times (10% 
of the rounds in the T4T and 35% of the rounds in the 
PT4T) over the course of the game at random times. The 
model predicts that participants will be sensitive to the 
trustworthiness of the confederate agent, responding by 
defecting more throughout the low trustworthiness 
conditions and less during the high trustworthiness 
conditions. 
 
3.2 Effects of Strategy 
 
The two types of strategies used by the confederate agent 
have different criteria for deciding what choice to choose 
during each round; these differences limit how quickly the 
model can change from  one outcome to another and the 
outcomes that can be achieved during a game. For 
example, continual alternation is an outcome that can only 
be achieved with the T4T strategy and not with the PT4T 
strategy. Continual mutual cooperation is also an outcome 
that is harder to achieve with the PT4T strategy, because it 
is inherently less trustworthy (i.e., more apt to defect). It is 
the differences in the behavior of these two strategies used 
by the confederate agent that affected the predicted 
frequency in which the optimal outcomes will be chosen 
despite differences in the trustworthiness of the 
confederate agent or the order in which the games are 
played. 
 
A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of 
mutual cooperation as a dependent variable, strategy as a 
fixed factor, with trustworthiness, order, and round as 
mixed effects. A likelihood ratio test was conducted and 
found that the strategy implemented by the confederate 
agent significantly affected the predicted frequency of 
mutual cooperation (X2(1) = 68.867, p < .001). The T4T 
strategy had a larger affect on the predicted frequency of 
mutual cooperation, increasing its predicted frequency by 
25.1% ± .7%, 95% CI [0 , 70%] compared to when the 
confederate agent used the PT4T strategy, increasing the 
predicted frequency of mutual cooperation by only 19% 
±13.7%, 95% CI [0 , 62%] (Fig 1.3). A second LME was 
run with the average predicted frequency of alternation as 
a dependent variable, strategy as a fixed factor, with 
trustworthiness, order, and round as random factors. 
Similar to mutual cooperation, the strategy used by the 
confederate agent was found to have a significant effect on 
the predicted frequency of alternation (X2(1) = 392.21, p < 
.001). Conditions where the confederate agent used the 
T4T strategy had a larger affect on the predicted frequency 
of alternation, increasing the frequency by 12.9% ± 0.4%, 
95% CI [6% , 30%] in conditions where the confederate 
agent used the T4T strategy compared to only 4% ± 6%, 
95% CI [0% , 20%] when it used the PT4T strategy (Fig 
1.3). 
 
The strategy used by the confederate agent was also found 
to have a significant effect on the predicted frequency of 
mutual defection, controlling for trustworthiness and order. 
A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of 
mutual defection as a dependent variable and strategy as a 
fixed factor, with trustworthiness, order, and round as 
random effects. A likelihood ratio test was conducted and 
found that the strategy used by the confederate agent had a 
significant effect on the predicted frequency of mutual 
defection (X2(1) = 574.02, p < .001). Conditions where the 
confederate agent used the PT4T 
 
Fig 1.3. A comparison of the average predicted frequency per round of three different outcomes: mutual cooperation (CC), 
alternation (ALT), and mutual defection (DD), across all the Tit-for-Tat (T4T, solid black line) and Pavlov-Tit-For-Tat 
(PT4T, dashed red line) conditions. The 95% confidence intervals per round for each outcome and condition are also 
plotted 
 
strategy had a larger effect on the predicted frequency of 
mutual defection, increasing its frequency by 54.1% ± 
29%, 95% CI [0%, 100%], compared to when the 
confederate agent used the T4T strategy increasing the 
predicted frequency of mutual defection by only 36.31% ± 
.6%, 95% CI [0% , 100%] (Fig 1.3). 
 
The model predicts that participants will react differently 
to the two different strategies used by the confederate 
agent. Alternation and mutual cooperation are both 
predicted to occur at a higher frequency during all of the 
T4T conditions compared to the PT4T conditions. A higher 
predicted frequency of alternation occuring during the T4T 
conditions would be expected, because the PT4T strategy 
cannot continually alternate throughout the game like the 
T4T strategy. However, the T4T and PT4T strategy can 
both mutually cooperate throughout a game. The difference 
that the frequency of mutual cooperation is predicted to 
occur is caused by the strategies’ behavior during the 
experiment when played with repeatedly, because repeated 
instances of mutual cooperation are harder to obtain with 
the PT4T strategy than with the T4T strategy. In addition, 
as is seen in the model’s predictions, the PT4T condition is 
predicted to have a higher frequency of mutual defection 
across all conditions, which would affect the model’s trust 
in the confederate agent, leading it to cooperate less in 
conditions where the confederate agent used the PT4T 
strategy compared to the T4T strategy. 
 
3.3 Effects of Order 
 
The optimal outcomes that are chosen during the 
experiment depend on the games that are played during 
each condition. For example, alternation is the optimal 
outcome in CG, but is not an optimal outcome in PD, 
because alternating between a payoff of +4 and -4 points 
per round leads to a net gain of 0 for both players. While 
playing PD, mutual cooperation is the optimal strategy and 
though mutual cooperation is a possible outcome in CG, it 
leads to a sub-optimal outcome compared to alternation, +1 
point per round compared to +3 points every other round. 
Juvina et al. (2013) found that order also affects the 
frequency of the optimal outcomes during a game. The 
optimal outcome in either PD or CG occured more 
frequently when it was played after the other game 
compared to when played first. Due to the effects that order 
has been seen to have on the outcomes that are chosen over 
the course of both games, the model will predict a 
significant difference in the frequency of the two optimal 
outcomes over the course of the two games depending on 
the order that they are played.  
 
A LME was run with the average predicted frequency of 
mutual cooperation as a dependent variable, order as a 
fixed effect, with trustworthiness and strategy of the 
confederate agent and round as random effects. A 
likelihood ratio test was conducted and found that the order 
in which the games were played in a condition significantly 
affected the frequency of mutual cooperation (X2(3) = 
712.98, p < .001), increasing the predicted frequency of 
mutual cooperation by 36.6% ±1%, 95% CI [0% , 79%] in 
the simulated conditions when PD was played repeatedly 
(PDPD order), 28.47% ± 1%, 95% CI [0% , 71%], when 
PD was played before CG (PDCG order), 13.10% ± 1% , 
95% CI [0% , 71%], when CG was played before PD 
(CGPD order), and 10% ±12.3%, 95% CI [0% , 51%], 
when CG was played twice (CGCG order). 
 
Fig 1.4. Comparison of the model predictions of the average predicted frequency per round of two different optimal 
outcomes: mutual cooperation (CC, solid black line) and alternation (ALT, dashed red line), across all of the different 
orders that PD and CG were played in. The 95% confidence intervals per round for each outcome and condition are also 
plotted. 
To test the significance of the effect of order on the 
predicted frequency of alternation, a LME was run with the 
average predicted frequency of alternation as a dependent 
variable, order as a fixed factor, with trustworthiness and 
strategy of the confederate agent and round as random 
effects. The order in which the games were played was 
found to significantly affect the predicted frequency of 
alternation, opposite that of the predicted frequency of 
mutual cooperation (X2(3) = 712.98, p < .001). Game order 
affected the frequency of alternation by 15.5% ±5.9%, 95% 
CI [0% , 33%], in simulated conditions with the CGCG 
order, 11.9% ± .5%, 95% CI [0% , 23%], in the CGPD 
order, 4.95% ± .05%, 95% CI [0 % , 23%], in the PDCG 
order, and 1.86% ±.05%, 95% CI [0% , 20%], in the PDPD 
order (Fig 1.4). 
 
The affect that the order games were played had on the 
predicted frequency of the optimal outcomes show that in 
conditions where the same game is played repeatedly, such 
as in the PDPD and CGCG order, the model predicts that 
the frequency of the optimal outcome for that game will 
continue to increase throughout the condition. The model 
also makes an uncharacteristic prediction about the 
frequency that mutual cooperation and alternation in the 
conditions simulated with the PDCG and CGPD order. It 
would be expected based on results from Juvina et al. 
(2013), that conditions with the PDCG order would have a 
higher frequency of alternation than the CGPD order, and 
that the CGPD order would have a higher frequency of 
mutual cooperation than with the PDCG order. Instead, the 
model predicts that when PD and CG are played in 
sequence, the highest frequency of mutual cooperation will 
be in conditions with the PDCG order and the highest 
frequency of alternation will occur in conditions with the 
CGPD order. 
 
3.4 Predicted Transfer Effects 
Previous results with human pairs have found that when 
PD and CG were played in sequence, transfer effects 
between these two games occur along both their surface 
and deep similarities (Juvina et al., 2013). The same 
transfer effects have also been found when cognitive 
models were paired with one another (Juvina et al., 2014) 
In contrast, when a cognitive model was paired with a pre-
programmed agent as in the current study, no deep transfer 
effects are predicted; the model only predicts surface 
transfer effects. Mutual cooperation in the T4T HT 
condition is predicted to occur at a higher frequency during 
CG when played after PD compared to when played before 
PD (t(49) = -21.8871, p <  .001). The same prediction about 
the frequency of mutual cooperation is made during the 
PT4T HT condition. Mutual cooperation is predicted to 
occur at a higher frequency during CG when played after 
PD compared to when played before PD (t(49) = -38.429, 
p < .001).  
 
The surface transfer effect of mutual cooperation in the 
PDCG order during the PT4T HT condition is amplified by 
the limitations of the confederate agent’s strategy. Because 
continual alternation cannot be achieved with the PT4T 
strategy, mutual cooperation, a sub-optimal outcome in 
CG, is left as the only satisfactory outcome that can be 
achieved given the behavior of the confederate agent. One 
possible explanation for the lack of deep transfer effects in 
the model’s predictions is the difference between the 
behavior of the confederate agent and an actual human 
player. The confederate agent is simpler than the model 
(even with the added randomness) and does not learn from 
the interaction with the model throughout the game. If 
confirmed, the prediction of a lack of deep transfer will 
strengthen the claim made in Juvina et al. (2013, 2014) that 
joint learning and reciprocal trust are key ingredients for a 
deep transfer of learning in games of strategic interaction. 
4. Conclusion 
 
In summary, we are validating a computational cognitive 
model that has shown to be able to account for the transfer 
effects that are observed when the games PD and CG are 
played repeatedly and in sequence with human 
participants. In order to validate the model, we have made 
a priori model predictions about the behavior of human 
participants when playing against a preprogrammed 
confederate agent across a variety of conditions. From the 
model’s predictions we have developed five hypotheses for 
the upcoming study. 
H1: We predict that mutual defection will be chosen more 
across all of the low trustworthiness conditions compared 
to the high trustworthiness conditions.     
H2: We predict both optimal outcomes (i.e., mutual 
cooperation and alternation) will be chosen at a higher 
frequency in condtions where the confederate agent uses 
the T4T compared to the PT4T strategy. 
H3: We predict that the frequency of both optimal 
outcomes (i.e., mutual cooperation and alternation) will 
depend on the order that games are played in a conditon.  
H4: We predict that across the sixteen conditions no deep 
transfer of learning will occur. 
H5: We predict that across the sixteen conditions surface 
transfers of learning will only occur with the mutual 
coopertion outcome in the PDCG PT4T HT and PDCG 
T4T HT condition. 
We expect to run the study in 2015. A subsequenct 
publication will reveal the actual empirical results and 
degree of model predictive validity. 
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